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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the recent upsurge in foreign acquisitions of U.S. firms, specifically focusing
on acquisitions made by firms located in emerging markets. Neoclassical theory predicts that, on net,
capital should flow from countries that are capital-abundant to countries that are capital-scarce. Yet
increasingly emerging market firms are acquiring assets in developed countries. Using transaction-specific
acquisition data and firm-level accounting data we evaluate the post-acquisition performance of publicly
traded U.S. firms that have been acquired by firms from emerging markets over the period 1980-2007.
Our empirical methodology uses a difference-in-differences approach combined with propensity score
matching to create an appropriate control group of non-acquired firms. The results suggest that emerging
country acquirers tend to choose U.S. targets that are larger in size (measured as sales, total assets
and employment), relative to matched non-acquired U.S. firms before the acquisition year. In the years
following the acquisition, sales and employment decline while profitability rises, suggesting significant
restructuring of the target firms.
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1.  Introduction 
This  paper  examines  the  recent  upsurge  in  foreign  acquisitions  of  U.S.  firms,  specifically 
focusing on acquisitions made by firms located in emerging markets.  Neoclassical theory predicts that, 
on net, capital should flow from countries that are capital-abundant to countries that are capital-scarce.
1 
Yet increasingly emerging-market firms are acquiring assets in the developed world. In particular, the 
recent spate of cross-border acquisitions by Indian and Chinese companies is the subject of heated debate 
in policy circles. For example, the acquisition bid by CNOOC, the Chinese state-owned oil company, to 
takeover Unocal met with considerable resistance in Washington and was ultimately thwarted. This paper 
provides a systematic analysis of what happens to U.S. firms when emerging-market acquisitions are 
successfully completed. Using transaction-specific acquisition data and firm-level accounting data, the 
goal of this study is to determine how U.S. firms that are acquired by firms from emerging markets fare 
relative to their non-acquired counterparts. 
   Evidence  from  developed-market  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  flows  to  emerging  markets 
suggests  that  foreign  ownership  is  associated  with  improvements  in  plant  productivity  (Aitken  and 
Harrision,  1999,  Perez-Gonzales,  2005,  Arnold  and  Javorcik,  2005,  Petkova,  2007).
2  The  sources  of 
productivity gains are generally attributed to the ability of foreign multinationals to transfer superior 
technology, bring organizational capital and provide access to international capital markets (Caves, 1996). 
In the case of recent emerging-market acquisitions, while the role of sovereign wealth funds and the 
build-up  of  U.S.  dollar  reserves  in  emerging-markets  are  seen  as  motivations  for  acquisitions  in 
developed-markets, the productivity-improving role of technology transfers from emerging- to developed-
markets are not obvious.  
Traditional  theories  of  FDI  also  rely  on  comparative  input  costs  or  market  access  as  the 
motivating  rationale  for  investment  flows  from  developed  to  emerging  markets.  Whereas  industrial 
country  acquirers  often  seek  lower  labor  costs  in  emerging-markets,  emerging-market  acquirers  may 
relocate (or insource) manufacturing activity while keeping existing distribution networks in the host 
country of the acquired business. These differences in motivation for FDI may, in turn, suggest that the 
post-acquisition performance of target firms will be influenced by the country of origin of the acquiring 
firm. 
                                                 
1  According to estimates by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the developing economies as a group had a 
current account surplus of $640 billion in 2007 (IMF, 2007).  Because the financial counterpart to this surplus is a 
deficit on the financial accounts, it represents the net capital outflow to the industrial economies.  Just two years 
earlier, in 2005, net capital flowed in the other direction (the developing economies as a group reported a gross 
capital inflow of $720 billion). 
2 FDI includes “Greenfield” investment in new assets in a foreign country, and acquisition of pre-existing foreign 
assets (also termed “Brownfield” investment).     2
The most common motivations for overseas expansions by emerging-market firms include: 1) 
entering new markets, 2) obtaining natural resources, and 3) acquiring advanced technology and related 
brand equity.
3 An example which highlights these factors is Lenovo's 2004 purchase of IBM's personal 
computer business. This acquisition involved entry into the U.S. market, acquisition of technology, and of 
an  established  brand.
4  Even  unsuccessful  acquisitions,  such  as  CNOOC's  bid  for  Unocal,  point  to 
emerging market demand for natural resources.  
The transaction-specific data on cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) used in this 
paper come from the Thompson Financial SDC Platinum database that records all M&As involving U.S. 
firms that were announced between January 1, 1980 and July 1, 2007. We focus on publicly traded U.S. 
targets both because open financial markets in the U.S. have led to a substantial number of cross-border 
M&As, and because public U.S. firms are required to disclose detailed accounting data. It is also worth 
noting that Forbes (2008) finds evidence that foreigners hold greater shares of their investment portfolios 
in the United States if they have less developed financial markets, suggesting that our focus on FDI by 
emerging market firms may provide insights into the implications of broader investment trends into the 
U.S. 
The work that follows complements the existing literature on post-acquisition firm performance. 
The focus on acquisitions made by emerging country firms allows us to test the general applicability of 
theories of FDI flows for firms in apparently capital scarce markets.  
To evaluate the impact of emerging-country acquisitions on U.S. firm performance we examine 
both stock market and accounting measures. The stock market measure, abnormal announcement returns, 
provides a forward-looking estimate of expected shareholder value creation. After the acquisition has 
taken place accounting measures of profitability, investment, sales and employment allow us to evaluate 
the ex post performance of U.S. targets.  
The  first  empirical  challenge  we  face  in  estimating  post-acquisition  performance  is  one  of 
causality versus selection. Are emerging-market firms simply picking certain types of acquisition targets 
or do foreign acquisitions change target-firm performance? There is some evidence in the literature of 
how  acquirers  select  targets.  In  particular,  the Froot  and  Stein  (1991)  model  shows  that  asymmetric 
information could lead foreign firms to buy U.S. firms in times when the value of the U.S. dollar is low 
relative to the foreign currency. They provide empirical evidence of a negative relationship between the 
value of the dollar and FDI flows into the U.S. using aggregate FDI data, and this relationship is also 
explored  in  Chen  (2008b)  using  more  detailed  firm-level  data.  Harris  and  Ravenscraft  (1990)  find 
                                                 
3 See reports by Citigroup (2005) and Boston Consulting Group (2005). 
4 Lenovo had the right to use the IBM brand for five years, but actually dropped it after three years, apparently 
because its own brand name was already so well established.   3
evidence that foreign firms prefer technology-intensive industries and Slaughter (2007) describes how 
U.S. states differ in their incentive packages and taxes with regards to foreign acquirers.
5 We also find 
evidence of selection in that emerging country firms tend to acquire public U.S. targets with relatively 
high levels of sales, employment and total assets. 
Crucial  to  any  comparison  between  pre-and  post-acquisition  performance  of  target  firms  is 
therefore the issue of selecting an appropriate expected performance benchmark in the absence of the 
acquisition (Andrade et. al., 2001). The fact is that some firms get acquired while others do not. Ideally, 
one would like to compare the performance of a firm that receives foreign investment to the performance 
of the firm’s identical twin with no foreign investment.
6  
In this paper we ask the counterfactual question: what would have happened to those firms that 
did, in fact, receive foreign ownership, if they had not received it? While this exact counterfactual is not 
typically  observable,  propensity  score  matching,  which  involves  selecting  a  “control”  group  of  non-
acquired firms closely matched to the “treatment” group of acquired firms, is one way to artificially create 
sets  of  such  twins.  Propensity  score  matching  can  then  be  combined  with  difference-in-differences 
estimates to further eliminate time-invariant and unobservable differences between the acquired and non-
acquired firms. 
In order to measure the performance of U.S. target firms after they are acquired, we focus on the 
accounting measure of operating income before depreciation, amortization and taxes (OIBD). In order to 
control for the relative size of the target firm, we scale OIBD by total assets, thus focusing on return on 
assets (ROA). We also track changes  in other aspects of target firm operations, such as investment, 
employment, and sales following the acquisition.  
We find that the stock price response of target firms is positive and significant around the time of 
acquisition  announcement.  Average  cumulative  returns  on  the  target  stock  price  within  a  three-day 
window around the announcement date of the acquisition increase by 8%. This return remains significant 
and positive when we extend the window to ten and twenty-one business days.  
Correspondingly,  we  find  that  after  acquisition  the  performance  of  acquired  targets  tends  to 
improve. The target firm's return on assets increases by 16% in the five years following acquisition. 
Further, there is strong evidence that acquiring firms undertake significant restructuring of target firms.  
Measures of employment, sales and plant, property and equipment in the target firms decrease in the years 
after acquisition.  
                                                 
5 At the Federal level there were few legal restrictions on FDI into the United States during the time period studied 
here, although more stringent laws were recently put into place in order to restrict FDI that threatens U.S. “national 
security”; these restrictions came into effect in 2007.  See: http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/international-affairs/cfius/ 
6 An alternative question, which is explored in Chen (2008a), is whether, given that a firm is acquired, the country of 
origin of the acquirer matters (so that the control group is other acquired firms rather than non-acquired firms).   4
The  pattern  of  increasing  profitability  (income/assets)  and  declining  sales  is  consistent  with 
improvements in firm-efficiency following acquisition. For instance if firms shut down or get rid of 
unprofitable divisions, sales would go down but profits as a percent of assets would increase. Also, 
declining employment and net PP&E suggest downsizing of divisions to improve overall profitability as a 
percent of assets. Declining sales in the target firms along with the downsizing of employment are also 
consistent with the comparative input cost hypothesis where acquirers from emerging-markets may be in 
the position to exploit the low wages in their home countries by downsizing labor-intensive activities in 
the foreign country following the acquisition. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature. 
Section 3 introduces the various datasets employed in the empirical analysis. The details of the difference-
in-differences propensity score matching estimator are explained in Section 4. Section 5 presents the 
empirical results and section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Related Literature 
A large empirical literature compares the productivity of foreign-owned versus domestic-owned 
firms. Doms and Jensen (1995) find that foreign-owned companies in the U.S. are more productive than 
domestic-owned ones, but are on average less productive than U.S.-owned multinational companies. A 
number of studies have investigated the causal link between foreign ownership and plant performance, 
where  the  target  firm  is  usually  situated  in  an  emerging  market  while  the  acquirer  firm  is  from  a 
developed market.  
Aitkin and Harrison (1999) conclude from a sample of Venezuelan firms that foreign ownership 
is correlated with productivity improvements. Using detailed plant-level information from Mexico, Perez-
Gonzales (2005) finds that multinational control leads to large improvements in total factor productivity, 
particularly in industries that rely on technological innovations from their parent companies. Arnold and 
Javorcik (2005) use plant-level data from Indonesia and find that foreign ownership leads to significant 
improvements in productivity in the year of acquisition as well as in subsequent years. Petkova (2008) 
conducts a similar study using Indian plant level data and concludes that foreign owned plants only 
experience improvements in productivity at a three-year horizon.  
In the developed-market context, a series of papers concentrating on acquisition targets in the 
United Kingdom, Girma et al. (Girma, 2005; Girma et al., 2006, 2007) document improvements in growth 
rates of firm performance following foreign acquisitions. These studies, however, do not specifically 
differentiate  between  emerging  and  developed  country  acquirers.  Antkiewicz  and  Whalley  (2006) 
highlight several case studies of recent completed and failed attempts by Chinese companies to acquire   5
firms in the OECD. They suggest that the recent wave of Chinese outbound M&A is driven by the 
necessity to acquire access to resources, new technology and distribution networks in the target country.   
Our study is also related to studies analyzing the effects of foreign and domestic M&As on firm 
stock market performance. Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) examine the effects of inbound U.S. FDI on 
shareholder wealth over the period 1970-1987 and find that target firm wealth gains are significantly 
higher in cross-border takeovers than in domestic acquisitions. While they do not focus on the country of 
origin of the acquiring firms, over their sample period, there were very few emerging-market acquisitions 
of U.S. firms.
 7  
Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) analyze the operating performance for the combined firm in 
domestic acquisitions relative to the industry median and show that the operating cash flows of merged 
firms actually drop from their pre-merger level on average, but that the non-merging firms in the same 
industry  drop  considerably  more.  Thus,  the  post-merger  combined  operating  performance  improves 
relative to the industry benchmark. Andrade et. al  (2001) use an annual cross sections  methodology 
similar in spirit to Fama and Macbeth (1973) and find that post-merger operating margins (cash flow to 
sales) improve, on average, relative to industry benchmarks. Using propensity score matching, we find 
that the return on assets for acquired firms increases significantly relative to the matched control group of 
non-acquired firms.  
 
3.  Data Description 
Our data sample contains all M&As involving U.S. firms initiated by firms in emerging markets 
that are announced between January 1, 1980 and July 1, 2007, and are reported by SDC Platinum, a 
database from Thompson Financial. The data include all public and private M&A transactions involving 
at least 5% ownership
8 of a target firm in the U.S
9. SDC collates information from over 200 English and 
foreign  language  news  sources,  SEC  filings  and  the  filings  from  its  international  counterparts,  trade 
publications,  news  wire  reports,  and  proprietary  surveys  of  investment  banks,  law  firms,  and  other 
advisory firms. For each transaction, the SDC database provides the date on which the transaction was 
first announced as well as the date on which the transaction became effective. The database provides 
characteristics of the target and acquiring firms including: name, nation, industry sector, and primary 
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). The database also includes transaction-specific 
                                                 
7 Edwards and Krugman (1995) provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of the growth of inward U.S. FDI from 
other industrial countries, focusing on economic and national security implications. 
8 The IMF and the OECD define FDI using a 10% threshold, though a broader definition of FDI is ownership of an 
amount of shares or voting power that allows participation in the management or control of the target firm.   
9 See Appendix A for a full list of the markets included in the database.   6
information on percent of shares acquired, the percent of shares owned before and after the transaction is 
completed, the percent of shares sought by the acquiring firm, and the method of payment.  
Over the sample period, SDC covered 7,996 completed M&A transactions between a foreign 
acquirer and a U.S. target. Out of that total number, 2,368 M&A transactions (30%) were conducted 
between foreign firms and publicly traded U.S. targets. The focus of the analysis in the paper is on the 
subsample of 480 outbound M&A transactions by emerging country firms and U.S. target firms that 
remain publicly traded after acquisition. Furthermore, we eliminate countries that are tax havens, e.g. 
Bahamas,  Bermudas
10,  etc.  which  leaves  us  with  a  sample  of  259  M&A  transactions.  Among  the 
remaining deals, 81 transactions involve multiple acquisitions of the same target. We only include the 
first of multiple acquisitions in our dataset as we are interested in what happens to a U.S. target when it is 
first acquired by an emerging-market firm.  This trims our sample to 214 transactions. Where information 
is available, these observations cover M&A transactions that result in a change in majority control in the 
target firm as well as acquisitions of minority shares. Most of our observations include information on the 
method of payment, the value of the transaction, and the NAICS codes of the respective acquirer and 
target firms.  
Data on the U.S. target firms come from Compustat and the Center for Research in Securities 
Prices (CRSP). Compustat reports financial statement data and CRSP contains stock return information. 
Information provided in SDC on our target firms allows matching across these databases. During this 
process,  we  lose  observations  because  some  of  the  target  firms  are  renamed  after  acquisition  or  are 
delisted.  The availability of data in Compustat varies significantly by year and by variable. For example, 
the employment variable is only reported on a voluntary basis in Compustat. Out of the original 214 
transactions between emerging country acquirers and public U.S. targets in the SDC dataset, roughly 120 
firms (56%) have performance variables reported in Compustat over the five years post acquisition and 
175 firms (81%) have usable stock returns data in CRSP.  
Table 1 presents information by country of origin on the number and value of acquisitions of U.S. 
firms. The top five emerging market countries whose firms acquired U.S. targets over the period 1980-
2007 are: Hong Kong, Singapore, Mexico, South Korea, and Taiwan. Figure 1 displays the number of 
publicly traded U.S. firms that were acquired by emerging country firms by year; acquisitions occurred in 
each of the years in our sample. In about half of all M&As reported in SDC information is available on 
the  value  of  the  deal.  Figure  2  presents  this  information  together  with  the  number  of  deals  and  the 
industry in which the target firm is located. In the figure the surface area of each bubble shows the total 
value of deals within each one-digit industry sector, while the location of the bubble is determined by the 
average value and the total number of deals within an industrial sector. The figure indicates that in about 
                                                 
10 See Appendix A for a list of tax-haven markets as defined by the OECD (2008).   7
half of all transactions the target firm is in the manufacturing sector and the average value of acquisitions 
in the manufacturing sector is much larger than the value of acquisitions in other industries.  
Table 2 displays the top 20 deals by acquisition value between emerging country firms and public 
U.S. targets. About half of the top twenty M&A transactions are horizontal, meaning that the acquirer and 
the target are in the same industry. In our full sample about one sixth of the deals involve horizontal 
M&As and about one third of the deals involve an acquisition of 50 percent or more of the target. Finally, 
Table 3 provides average accounting information (OIBD, sales and employment) for the target firms 
sorted by NAICS industry.  
 
4.  Empirical Strategy 
4.1 Difference-in-Differences Matching Estimation 
It seems unlikely that emerging country firms acquire U.S. firms at random.  As discussed in the 
introduction,  ideally,  in  order  to  evaluate  the  impact  of  foreign  ownership  we  would  like  to  have 
information on the set of prospective firms from which the target was selected. In other words, we would 
like to compare the performance of a firm that receives foreign investment to the performance of the 
firm’s identical twin (or multiple) with no foreign investment. While this sort of counterfactual is not 
generally observable, we use propensity score matching techniques to construct a control group of non-
acquired U.S. firms that closely match the U.S. targets. A firm is “selected” into the control group if it is 
sufficiently similar to acquired U.S. firms on the basis of the key determinants of the acquisition decision.  
In other words, our goal is to find a set of control firms that are a priori equally likely to be acquired by an 
emerging-market firm as those firms which ultimately are acquired. 
Let  , {0,1} it A    be a dummy variable indicating whether a U.S. firm is acquired by an emerging-
market firm at time t and let 
1
, i t u y    denote target firm performance u periods after the acquisition takes 
place, where  0 u   . The performance of a matched non-acquired U.S. firm is given by
0
, i t u y   . For a given 
U.S. firm, we will only observe performance in one of the two states; foreign acquisition (
1
, i t u y   ), or not 
(
0
, i t u y   ). The average effect of an emerging-market firm acquisition of a U.S. target is the following: 
10
,, [ | 1] i t u i t u E y y A        
   
1 0 0 0
, , , , [ | 1] [ | 0] [ | 1] [ | 0] i t u i t u i t u i t u E y A E y A E y A E y A                          
The term in the first line is the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET), and the term in the 
second line in braces is a “selection'' term, which is zero if the assignment to the treatment and control 
groups is random.  Our assumption is that firms have observable characteristics, X, that make them   8
attractive targets. Our approach is to match acquired and non-acquired firms on the basis of these Xs and 
then calculate the treatment differential (the effect of being acquired) on each of the outcome variables of 
interest. The average of the differential over all acquired firms and all Xs measures the average effect of 
foreign acquisition. Formally, Angrist and Krueger (2000) show that effect of the treatment on the treated 
is given by 
   
1 0 1 0
, , , , [ | 1] [ | , 1] [ | , 0]| 1 i t u i t u i t u i t u E y y A E E y X A E y X A A                        
[ | 1] x EA       , 
where 
10
,, [ | , 1] [ | , 0] x i t u i t u E y X A E y X A              .  The  underlying assumption  is  that  all  the  firms 
(whether  acquired  or  not)  have  the  same  expected  performance  under  domestic  ownership.  This  is 
referred to as the conditional independence assumption (CIA): 
 
0 0 0
, , , [ | , 1] [ | , 0] [ | ] i t u i t u i t u E y X A E y X A E y X               . 
 
For the CIA to be satisfied, the vector X should contain all variables that affect both acquisition 
and performance outcomes. The choice of variables included in X is described in more detail below. 
Another assumption required for matching is that it is not possible to predict the probability of a foreign 
acquisition perfectly, i.e. 0 Pr( 1| ) 1 AX       .  
Matching  on  a  vector  of  variables  is  difficult  since  it  requires  weighting  differences  in  one 
dimension  against  another.  Rosenbaum  and  Rubin  (1983)  provide  a  solution  to  this  dimensionality 
problem by matching firms on propensity scores, which in our context is the conditional probability of 
being acquired by an emerging county firm given X: 
, , 1 Pr( ( )) i i t i t P A A X      . 
This matching technique allows us to take into account differences in observable characteristics 
across the firms in our database. We then combine matching with difference-in-differences analysis to 
eliminate the differences between the acquired and control firms that are unobservable and time invariant.  
Rather  than  treating  each  of  our  firms  linearly and  with  the  same  weight,  our  difference-in-
differences estimator paired with propensity score matching allows us to include only acquired firms 
within  the  common  support  and  picks  control  firms  according  to  the  metric  function  specific  to  the 
matching method. We limit the common support to only contain those treated firms that do not lie above 
the maximum or below the minimum propensity score for the matched control group. Similarly, matched 
control group firms that lie above the maximum or below the minimum propensity score for the treated 
firms are also dropped from the analysis.      9
In our analysis, we use the Mahanalobis distance metric, which allows us to confine the matching 
between the acquired and control firms to the same 2-digit industry. Mahanalobis metric matching by 
itself  uses  the  observable  covariates  directly,  by  minimizing  a  distance  defined  for  covariate  values 
X1(treated) and X2(control) as 
1 1/2
1 2 1 2 {( ) ( )}
T
c X X S X X
     , 
where Sc is the control sample covariance matrix. For the combined method, all non-acquired U.S. firms 
within intervals surrounding each acquired firm’s propensity score are identified as potential matches, and 
then Mahalanobis metric matching is applied to the subset of covariates, in our case 2-digit industry 
characteristics, to make final selections from these potential matches.   Finally, the standard errors from 
the matching estimation are bootstrapped as suggested by Becker and Ichino (2002).  
 
4.2 Evidence of Selection 
In order to examine whether our assumption that firms are not randomly selected for acquisition 
is  justified  we  check  whether  firm  characteristics  prior  to  acquisition  are  correlated  with  subsequent 
foreign ownership.  Our test involves a regression of our various performance measures on two dummy 
variables.  The first dummy variable indicates those U.S. firms with foreign ownership in year t.  The 
second dummy variable is switched on three years prior to the ownership change, for those U.S. firms that 
were eventually foreign acquisition targets. We also control for industry, region and year fixed effects in 
the  regression.  The  estimation  results,  presented  in  Table  4,  illustrate  that  future  foreign  acquisition 
targets are larger in size, measured by log sales and log total assets, than non-acquired domestic firms up 
to three years before acquisition. Furthermore, the regression estimates indicate that acquired firms have 
more  employees  and  higher  debt  than non-acquired  firms.  These  systematic  differences  indicate  that 
foreign investors do not choose target firms at random.  Our analysis of the post acquisition performance 
of U.S. firms takes this selection into account. 
 
4.3 Timing Issues 
Unlike longitudinal matching studies, where treatment occurs uniformly at one point in time, the 
firms in our data set are targets of acquisition at varying times. This variation in treatment timing poses 
the  challenge  of  how  to  assign  counterfactual  treatment  dates  to  the  firms  that  are  not  acquired  by 
emerging-market firms. We follow Petkova's (2008) approach of proportional-random acquisition time 
assignment. We determine the fraction of the total number of acquisitions that occur in each calendar year 
during our sample period, and then assign the hypothetical treatment year to the firms in the control group 
in the same proportion as their occurrences in the acquisition group. For example, if one tenth of all 
acquisitions occurred in 1995 in our sample of targets, then one tenth of all firms in the control group   10
receive the hypothetical treatment year 1995. Before assigning the date, we make sure that the control 
firm's  year  of  incorporation  precedes  the  treatment  year  and  that  the  firm  remains  non-acquired 
throughout the entire span of our data. 
 
4.4 Propensity Score Matching Estimation 
After assigning the hypothetical foreign acquisition dates to the control firms that are not acquired 
(do not receive treatment) over our sample period, we need to realign the time series data for each firm. 
More specifically, in the year of acquisition (actual or hypothetical), we set t=0, in the year following the 
acquisition t=1, and in the year prior to the acquisition, t=-1, etc. The propensity score is the estimated 
probability of being acquired in period t=0 based on firm characteristics in period t=-1. We estimate this 
probability using a probit model, where the dummy variable  , it A  equals 1 in the year a firm is the actual 
target of acquisition and zero otherwise
11.  
 
4.4.1 Choice of Covariates 
We select our control group of non-acquired firms based on a set of observable characteristics 
that comprise the vector  X. The control variables include factors that drive both the acquisition and 
performance of the firm, such as: age, size (measured by log of total assets, log of sales and log of 
employment), operating income, debt, cash, net income, and net property, plant, and equipment.  In the 
estimation, the values of each of these variables are from the year prior to the actual or hypothetical 
acquisition year.
12 The “age” of a firm indicates the level of development of a potential target. Variables 
such as total assets and sales convey information about the market power of the target firm as well as its 
productive  capacity.  Operating  income  before  depreciation  (OIBD)  and  net  income  describe  the 
profitability of the target firm. Debt and cash variables are indicators of the internal structure of the firm. 
Measures of property, plant and equipment gauge the physical capital stock of a firm. Lastly, we include 
year, region and industry dummies in the vector of control variables, where industry dummies are based 
on 2-digit NAIC codes and regional dummies are based on the U.S. state where the target firm is located.  
 
                                                 
11Alternatively, we could also assign zero to a target firm where there has been an acquisition announcement that 
eventually fell through. Due to the limited amount of data, however, this analysis was not feasible. 
12 In choosing the year preceding the acquisition, there arises a concern of an “Ashenfelter Dip.” This term is based 
on the finding in Ashenfelter (1978) that in job program evaluations, participants tend to experience a temporary 
decline in earnings prior to enrolling in a program. In this data set of target firms, however, there is no visible 
decline in target firm performance in the year prior to acquisition. As a robustness check we also use variables in 
different years prior to acquisition, the results remain unchanged.   11
5.  Results 
5.1 Preliminary Evidence: Stock Market Reaction to Acquisition Announcements 
If capital markets are semi-strong form efficient with respect to public information, stock prices 
will quickly adjust following an acquisition announcement, incorporating any expected value changes 
(Andrade  et  al,  2001).  The  two  commonly  used  event  windows  are  the  three  days  immediately 
surrounding the acquisition announcement, and a longer window beginning several days prior to the 
announcement and ending at the close of the acquisition. We examine the abnormal stock return for the 
acquired  targets  around  various  different  windows  of  time  surrounding  the  announcement  of  the 
acquisition.  
We calculate the mean cumulative return of the target stock price within a one, three, and twenty 
day window of the announcement date. We assume that stock prices follow a single factor market model. 
Our  estimation  period  is  280  days  before  and  up  until  30  days  preceding  the  event  date.  Using  a 
standardized value of the cumulative abnormal return, we test the null hypothesis that the return is equal 
to zero.
13  
Table 5 displays announcement period abnormal returns for U.S. targets that are acquired by 
emerging  country  firms.  The  announcement  period  cumulative  abnormal  return  over  the  three-day 
window is 8.9% for 175 completed acquisitions. When the event window is expanded to three days prior 
to the acquisition announcement and ending three days after the announcement, the mean abnormal return 
is essentially identical. Over an even longer window of twenty days, the mean abnormal return increases 
to 9.7%. In comparison to domestic U.S. M&As, where target firms' average three-day abnormal return is 
around  16%  for  the  three-day  window  and  rises  to  24%  over  the  longer  event  window  of  20  days 
(Andrade  et  al.  (2001)),  acquisitions  of  U.S.  targets  by  emerging-country  firms  tend  to  have  lower 
abnormal returns.  
 
5.2 Propensity Score Matching Estimates 
Our approach to constructing an appropriate comparison group of non-acquired firms involves a 
two-step  matching  process.    The  first  step,  a  probit  regression,  estimates  the  probability  of  foreign 
acquisition based on past values of various measures of firm performance (age, OIBD, cash, sales, assets, 
employment, debt, income) as well as state, year and industry fixed effects.  The results of the probit 
indicate that firms with more cash, and those firms located in certain states and from specific industries 
are more likely to be acquired.  We impose a common support by dropping treatment observations (firms 
that  are  acquired)  whose  propensity  score  is  higher  than  the  maximum  or  less  than  the  minimum 
                                                 
13 In future work we plan to also compare target firm returns to both their matched control firm returns and their 
industry average return on the announcement date.     12
propensity score of the firms that are not acquired. The second step involves using the Mahalanobis 
distance metric to select firms for the control group that are within the same 2-digit industry as the 
acquired firms.  
Figure 3 provides an illustration of the effects of our two-step Mahalanobis matching approach. 
The  three  densities  plotted  in  the  figure  depict  the  predicted  probability,  i.e.  propensity  score,  of 
acquisition  for  the  acquired  firms  (red),  the  non-matched  and  non-acquired  firms  (blue),  and  the 
Mahalanobis metric matched non-acquired firms (green). The Mahanalobis matching estimator performs 
extremely well as evidenced by the proximity between the density of the acquired firms and that of the 
Mahanalobis matched non-acquired firms.
14  In terms of our two step process, if we did not “select” our 
control group, this group would include all U.S. firms that are not acquired (the blue line). Our two-step 
matching involves constructing an appropriate counterfactual for each acquired firm given the set of 
observable covariates available for the firms. The propensity score provides a summary index of all the 
covariates combined, so that matching essentially brings the group of control firms closer to the acquired 
firms on all available dimensions.  
The density plot in Figure 3 reveals that among the non-acquired firms a large proportion have 
almost zero probability of being acquired.  A simple difference-in-difference estimator would treat these 
firms  the  same  as  those  non-acquired  firms  that  are  more  likely  to  be  acquired.  The  Mahanalobis 
matching estimator, in contrast, only selects firms that are similar to the acquired firms both in terms of 
propensity score as well as in industry. In other words, propensity score matching in this context ensures 
that our comparisons involve firms that are very similar prior to acquisition.  One could argue that this 
approach biases against finding differences in post acquisition performance (given that the firms are so 
similar prior to acquisition), but it also ensures that our tests will not simply be picking up differences in 
acquired and non-acquired firm performance that are unrelated to acquisition.   
 
5.2.1 Balancing Test 
One  way  to  assess  the  performance  of  our  propensity  score  matching  is  to  calculate  the 
standardized differences for the covariates in our probit regression. Specifically, for each covariate, we 
take the average difference between the acquired firms and the matched control firms and normalize it by 
the  pooled  standard  deviation  of  the  covariate in  the  acquired  and  control group  samples.  Based  on 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), we calculate the following measure: 
 
                                                 
14 We also try alternative matching estimators, such as kernel matching and propensity score reweighting. The 
difficulty with kernel matching is the selection of an appropriate bandwidth parameter. Although the point estimates 
based on propensity score reweighting are similar to our Mahalanobis results, the properties of the standard errors 
from propensity score reweighting are less clear.      13
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where n1 is the number of acquired firms and n0 is the number of non-acquired firms in the control group.  
Table 6 shows that our propensity score method does a good job of matching a set of control 
group firms that were not acquired to the set of firms that were acquired by emerging-market firms along 
the dimensions of the observable covariates. The balancing test results indicate that the differences in our 
matched parameters are all well below 20
15 indicating that our approach is capable of grouping together 
relatively similar firms. In particular, the covariates log cash, log sales, log employment, and log of net 
property, plant and equipment before matching show significant differences in means between acquired 
and non-acquired firms. After matching, however, the means of the covariates between the two groups are 
not significantly different.  
For instance, consider the firm-size characteristic as measured by log sales. The first row of 
coefficients  for  log  sales  compares  the  acquired  (treated)  firms  with  the  non-acquired  (control, 
unmatched) firms. In other words, the “unmatched control” refers to the set of firms that would have 
otherwise comprised the control group had we not undertaken propensity score matching. The coefficients 
for log sales in the first row suggest that the acquired firms are significantly larger, on average, than the 
unmatched set of control firms. The difference in size is statistically significant as evidenced by the t-
statistic and p-values in the final two columns. The second row presents mean log sales numbers for the 
acquired firms  along with the “matched control” firms that  were not acquired. In stark  contrast, the 
differences in log size are not significantly different across the treated and control groups when matching 
takes place. In fact the reduction in bias as a result of propensity score matching along the dimension of 
log sales is about 83%. The reduction in bias for other observable covariates ranges from 20% for the 
firm-age variable to 96% for the firm-cash variable. 
 
5.3 Post-Acquisition Performance 
Tables  7,  Panels  A-D  present  our  difference-in-differences  Mahalanobis  matching  results  for 
various measures of post-acquisition firm-performance.  t={0,5} denotes the post-acquisition year. The 
second  column  presents  the  matched  coefficient  estimate.    Estimates  in  bold  indicate  statistical 
differences  in  measured  post-acquisition  performance  for  acquired  and  matched  non-acquired  firms. 
                                                 
15 A value for the standardized difference between treated and matched control mean values suggested by 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).   14
Common support refers to the set of firms for whom the propensity score range overlaps across control 
(non-acquired) and treated (acquired) firms. Off support refers to the number of treated (acquired) firms 
whose propensity score lay above the maximum value or below the minimum value for the control (non-
acquired) firms. Note that changes in post-acquisition performance are calculated relative to year t=-1, 
prior to the acquisition.  
Panel A presents results for OIBD scaled by total assets, also referred to as return on assets 
(ROA). These estimates indicate that the ROA for acquired firms declines significantly compared to the 
firms in the “propensity score matched” control sample in the year of acquisition. It appears that profits 
continue to decline in years 1-3 following the acquisition but the decline is not statistically significant. In 
years four and five after the acquisitions the ROA increases significantly for acquired firms (relative to 
the non-acquired firms in our control group).  In particular, the ROA increases by 8.3% in year four and 
7.8% in year five for the acquired firms relative to the control sample and also relative to the year prior to 
the acquisition. The time-series pattern in the ROA numbers is consistent with restructuring in the early 
years following the acquisition leading to improved profitability in later years. We also conducted an F-
test of joint significance that shows that the post-acquisition increase in profitability is jointly significant 
across the five years following the acquisition. 
The advantage of our methodology is that we are able to identify the timing of the profitability 
improvements. Propensity score matching also requires large samples with substantial overlap between 
groups of the treated (acquired) and control (matched non-acquired) firms. From Table 7a, we see that the 
sample size of control firms under “common support” are an order of magnitude higher than the treated 
group suggesting that our estimates are measured with high precision. Moreover, the numbers under “off-
support” suggest that there is substantial over lap in the treated and control samples since only two firm 
years  of  treated  observations  are  excluded  from  the  estimation.  A  caveat  that  remains  is  that  while 
propensity score matching attempts to identify matched twins in the control group and difference-in-
differences estimation accounts for time-invariant, unobservable differences across treated and matched 
firms, hidden bias may remain because matching only controls for observed variables to the extent that 
they  are  perfectly  measured  (Shadish,  Cook  and  Campbell,  2002).  Also,  to  the  extent  that  there  are 
unobservable time-varying differences in firm characteristics across the treated and control samples, we 
are unable to account for them. However, it is not clear what unobservable and yet time-varying firm 
characteristics could vary across the two samples of firms.  
The results in Panels B-D in Table 7 indicate that employment, net property, plant, and equipment 
(PP&E), and sales all decrease significantly for acquired firms (again, relative to matched control non-
acquired firms) in the year of and the five years after the acquisition.  While the decline in employment   15
and net PP&E is significant only in the early years, the decline in sales appears to persist across the five 
years following the acquisition. 
The  pattern  of  increasing  profitability  (income/assets)  and  declining  sales  is  consistent  with 
improvements in firm-efficiency following acquisition. For instance if firms shut down or get rid of 
unprofitable divisions, sales would go down but profits as a percent of assets would increase. Also, 
declining employment and net PP&E suggest downsizing of divisions to improve overall profitability as a 
percent of assets. 
The  results  of  increasing  profitability  are  also  consistent  with  the  hypothesis  that  foreign 
ownership is associated with improvements in plant productivity (Aitken and Harrision, 1999, Perez-
Gonzales, 2005, Arnold and Javorcik, 2005, Petkova, 2007). Declining sales in the target firms along with 
the downsizing of employment are also consistent with the comparative input cost hypothesis. Acquirers 
from emerging-markets come from  environments  where labor  costs are low and they may be in the 
position to “insource” jobs by exploiting the low wages in their home countries by downsizing labor-
intensive  activities  in  the  foreign  country  following  the  acquisition.  However,  the  U.S.  target  also 
experiences  improvements  in  profitability  with  more  streamlined  but  efficient  operations  following 
restructuring by the emerging-market acquirer. 
 
5.4  Simple Difference-in Differences Estimation 
To highlight the importance of constructing an appropriate benchmark for comparison to evaluate 
post-acquisition performance we conduct a simple difference-in-differences estimation without propensity 
score matching. Here the underlying assumption is that US targets are chosen at random by emerging-
market  acquirers.  Table  8  (Panels  A-D)  present  the  results.  From  the  coefficient  estimates  we  may 
erroneously conclude that there is no significant difference in the post-acquisition performance between 
the  treated  (acquired)  and  control  (non-matched  non-acquired)  firms.  The  estimates  suggest  that 
OIBD/assets, employment, net PP&E and sales are not significantly different across the two groups of 
firms following the acquisition. The simple difference-in-differences are essentially comparing the post-
acquisition performance of targets to the performance of all non-acquired U.S. firms. If the acquired firms 
are bigger on average (as indicated in Table 4) in terms of assets, sales and employment before the 
acquisition,  and  continue  to  be  statistically  different  along  these  dimensions  after  the  acquisition  in 
comparison to the sample of all non-acquired firms, simple difference-in-differences estimates would lead 
to the inference that emerging-market acquisitions do not significantly alter the performance or operations 
of the target firms.
16 However, a comparison of the target firms with a set of hypothetical twin firms in the 
                                                 
16 In unreported results we find that the observable characteristics (such as size and employment) that distinguish the 
acquired and full (unmatched) set of non-acquired firms do not change significantly three years post-acquisition.   16
matched control set suggest that emerging-market acquirers undertake significant restructuring of the 
target firms following the acquisition. The post-performance indicators from Section 5.3 show that the 
acquirers downsize unprofitable divisions, as evidenced by falling sales and employment concomitant 
with  a  significant  increase  in  overall  firm-profitability.  This  simple  example  serves  to  illustrate  the 
importance of constructing a careful benchmark from which to evaluate post-acquisition performance and 
the advantage of propensity score matching in this context. 
  
5.5 Robustness Checks 
SDC Platinum also provides information about acquisitions that are announced but not completed 
or withdrawn. Using this sample of failed transactions we can examine whether the firms that were 
potential acquisition targets differ from their non-acquired counterparts. If it is foreign ownership that 
drives the post-acquisition performance of the acquired firms, then we expect that following propensity 
score matching, the firms that were “potential” targets should perform similarly to the firms that are in the 
matched control sample but not the subject of foreign interest since the foreign acquisition was never 
successfully completed. Although it is not possible to test this hypothesis given the limited number of 
failed acquisitions, Table 9 provides suggestive evidence; the eighteen potential targets in our sample 
experience declines in employment and increases in sales in the year the M&A transaction is announced 
and  are  similar  to  a  group  of  matched  non-acquired  firms  in  the  years  after  the  failed  acquisitions, 
suggesting that post-acquisition performance of acquired firms is driven by the transfer of ownership to 
foreign hands. However, given the small number of failed acquisitions in our sample, more formal 
statistical analysis is not possible. 
 We also perform a number of additional robustness checks that involve dividing our sample of 
acquired firms into various subgroups consisting of: 1) majority and minority control acquisitions, 2) 
acquisitions financed solely by cash, 3) only manufacturing firms, 4) acquiring firms located in Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea, and lastly, 5) firms not in the same industry as the acquiring 
firm. The estimates are shown in Table 10 (Panels A-H). The statistical significance of the results varies 
due to sample sizes. For example, for the group of horizontal acquisitions, in which both acquiring and 
target  firms  share  the  same  industry,  the  sample  size  is  much  smaller  than  that  for  diversifying 
acquisitions. Thus, although the magnitudes of the estimates are similar to those of the whole sample, the 
statistical significance is not. Overall, the robustness checks confirm the results in the main analysis when 
using the full sample. 
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6.  Conclusion 
This paper undertakes the first systematic analysis of the performance of U.S. firms that are 
acquired by firms located in emerging markets. To do so, we examine both stock market and accounting 
based measures of firm performance following the announcement of an acquisition of a U.S. firm by an 
emerging-market firm. In particular, we use transaction-level M&A information along with firm-level 
financial statement data to examine the post-acquisition performance of publicly listed U.S. targets. 
Our results suggest that emerging country firms tend to acquire public U.S. targets with relatively 
high levels of sales, employment and total assets. The selection of acquisition target is therefore non-
random. To address the issue of selection, we employ propensity score matching to carefully construct a 
matched sample of control firms that were not acquired. The matching methodology is combined with 
difference-in-differences estimation to eliminate time-invariant unobservable firm characteristics.  
The stock price response of these U.S. targets is positive and significant around the time of the 
acquisition announcement. Following the acquisition, the performance of target firms tends to improve. In 
particular, the return on assets in target firms increases by 16%, on average, in the five years following 
the acquisition. The evidence also suggests that U.S. target firms undergo significant restructuring after 
acquisition by an emerging-market firm. In particular, employment and capital decrease, suggesting that 
divisions may be sold off or closed down.  This conjecture is also supported by the fact that sales also 
decline after acquisition.  
  Our results indicate that (i) acquisitions by firms from emerging markets influence post-
acquisition performance of target firms (sales and employment decline, profits rise); and (ii) there is 
selection along observable characteristics based upon which emerging market firms choose acquisition 
targets in the U.S. (higher sales, assets, employment).  In the paper we attempt to control for (ii) using 
propensity-score-matching and difference-in-difference estimation.  There remains the possibility that 
selection  based  on  time-variant  unobservable  characteristics  (that  are  orthogonal  to  the  observable 
characteristics used in our propensity score matching) may be driving our results. However, the evidence 
presented in the paper strongly indicates that emerging market firm acquisitions impact the performance 
of  U.S.  target  firms.  More  generally,  the  results  in  the  paper  serve  to  illustrate  the  importance  of 
constructing careful benchmarks from which to evaluate post-acquisition performance and the advantage 
of propensity score matching in this context.   18
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Appendix A 
 
Acquiring Countries in the sample: 
Algeria,  Argentina,  Bahrain,  Brazil,  China,  Costa  Rica,  Croatia,  Ecuador,  Egypt,  Hong  Kong,  India, 
Indonesia, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Papua N Guinea, Russian Fed, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, 
South Africa, South Korea¸ Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Venezuela 
 
Tax Haven Countries (as defined by the OECD, 2008) excluded from the sample: 




Steps followed in our propensity score matching methodology: 
1.  Run Probit regression where: 
(a)  Dependent variable: Y=1, if a firm is acquired by an emerging-market firm; Y = 0, otherwise.  
(b) Choose  appropriate  conditioning  variables,  covariates  which  are  observable  firm 
characteristics such as age, size, profitability, financing-mix, etc. 
(c)   Obtain propensity score: predicted probability (p) or log[p/(1-p)]. 
 
2.  Match each acquired firm to one or more non-acquired firms based on propensity score. We use 
Mahalanobis metric matching in conjunction with propensity score matching to choose one non-
acquired firm from multiple matches restricted to be within the same two-digit industry as the 
acquired firm. Procedure: 
(a)  Calculate the distance between the acquired firm and all non-acquired firms in the same 
industry. The distance, d(i,j) can be defined by the Mahalanobis distance: 
d(i,j) = 
1 1/2
1 2 1 2 {( ) ( )}
T
c X X S X X
      
where X1 and X2 are propensity scores for acquired firm i and non-acquired firm j, and Sc is 
the sample covariance matrix of the matching variables from the full set of control group 
firms. 
(b) The  non-acquired  firm,  j,  with  the  minimum  distance  d(i,j)  is  chosen  as  the  match  for 
acquired firm i, and both are removed from the pool. 
(c)  Repeat the above process until matches are found for all acquired firms. 
(d) The standard errors from the matching estimation are bootstrapped following Becker and 
Ichino (2002). 
 
3.  Run  multivariate  difference-in-difference  regression  to  eliminate  time-invariant,  unobservable 
differences between acquired (treated) and non-acquired (matched control) firms to examine post 
acquisition firm performance.    21
Appendix C 
 
Details of Sample Construction: 
 
          N Percent 
Number of Transactions with a Foreign 
Acquirer and US Target 7,996  
           
Number of transactions with a Foreign 
Acquirer and a Public US Target 2,368 29.60% 
           
Number of Completed 
Transactions with Emerging-
Market Acquirer and public US 
Target  480 20% 
           
Number of Transactions with 
Tax Haven Country
17 as 
domicile of Acquirer 221 46% 
           
Number of Firms with Multiple 
Acquisitions 45 17% 
 
Source: SDC Thompson M&A database.
                                                 
17 Countries are listed in Appendix A.   22























Source: SDC Thomson M&A database. This figure shows the number of acquisitions of U.S. firms by 
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Figure 2: Number and Value of M&A deals by Target Sector 
Notes: The figure presents information on the industries in which the target firms belong along with the number (horizontal axis) 
and average value of the transaction (vertical axis).  The surface area of each bubble shows the total value of deals within  
each one-digit industry sector, while the location of the bubble  is determined by the average value and the total number of deals  
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Source: SDC Thompson M&A Database.   24
Figure  3:  Propensity  Scores  for  Acquired  (treated),  Control  (matched  non-treated)  and 
Non-treated non-weighted firms 
Notes: This figure provides an illustration of the effects of our two-step Mahalanobis matching 
approach. The three densities plotted in the figure depict the predicted probability, i.e. propensity 
score, of acquisition for the acquired firms (red), the non-weighted and non-acquired firms (blue), 


























Source: Authors’ calculations based on SDC Thompson M&A Database and Compustat North 
America 1980 – 2006.  25
Table 1:  Number and Value of Acquisitions of U.S. targets by firms in Emerging Markets, 
1980-2007. 
 
Notes: This table provides a break down of transactions by acquiring country. The first column 
lists the name of the acquiring country. The second column presents the number of transactions. 
The  third  column  presents  the  fraction  of  total  transactions  accounted  for  by  the  acquiring 











Value ($ mil) 
Hong Kong  57 26.64 3309.572 
Singapore  36 16.82 6412.92 
Mexico  26 12.15 9346.126 
Taiwan  13 6.07 731.567 
Saudi Arabia  11 5.14 1463.797 
South Korea  11 5.14 319.409 
India  10 4.67 154.346 
Russian Fed  7 3.27 932.947 
Argentina  5 2.34 5035.794 
China  5 2.34 44.83 
Bahrain  4 1.87 1478.356 
Kuwait  4 1.87 5.745 
Malaysia  4 1.87 38.11 
Brazil  3 1.4 4.313 
Egypt  2 0.93 8.905 
South Africa  2 0.93 1900.151 
Thailand  2 0.93 27.12 
Venezuela  2 0.93 63.27 
Algeria  1 0.47 0
Costa Rica  1 0.47 12.5
Croatia  1 0.47 1
Ecuador  1 0.47 0
Indonesia  1 0.47 23
Nigeria  1 0.47 6
Papua N Guinea  1 0.47 2.7
Trinidad & Tob  1 0.47 0.6
Uganda  1 0.47 0.68
Uzbekistan  1 0.47 30.8
Total  214 100%  
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Table 2: Transaction Characteristics of the Top Twenty Emerging Country Firm Acquisitions of U.S. Targets, 1980-2007. 
Notes: The table displays the top 20 deals by acquisition value between emerging country firms and public U.S. targets based on the 214 completed transactions 
in our sample. The transaction characteristics include target and acquirer names, nations and industries, the announcement date, the percent acquired, transaction 
value and method of payment. Source: SDC Thompson –M&A Database. 
 
Date 













Mfg. steel tubular 
prod  Tenaris SA  Mfg. seamless steel 






CEMEX SA DE 
CV 
Mfg.,whl cement,ready-
mix prod  100  2846.18  Mexico  Cash 
Liabilities 
11/22/1999 
DII Group  Mfg. electronic 
components 
Flextronics 
International Ltd  Mfg. electn components  100  2591.41  Singapore Common 
Stock 
2/12/2007 
Hydril Co LP  Mfg. oil,gas drilling 
equip  Tenaris SA  Mfg. seamless steel 
pipe prod  100  2212.17  Argentina Cash 
11/20/2006 
Oregon Steel 
Mills Inc  Mfg. steel prod  Evraz Group SA  Mfg. whl steel  90.87  2087.97  Russian 




Oil and gas 
exploration, prodn  YPF SA  Oil and gas 
exploration,prodn  100  1843.82  Argentina Cash 
Liabilities 
2/10/2004 
ChipPAC Inc  Mfg. semiconductors  ST Assembly Test 
Services Ltd 
Mfg. semiconductor 







Old Mutual South 
Africa  Insurance company  100  1456.67  South 
Africa  Cash 
9/24/1999 
ASARCO Inc  Mine, smelt, refine 
metals 
Nueva Grupo 







Whampoa Ltd  Pvd telecom svcs  6.03  957  Hong 
Kong  Cash   27
 
Date 










4/14/1997  APL Ltd  Shipping,trucking 
company 
Neptune Orient 
Lines Ltd  Shipping company  100  878.48  Singapore Cash  











company  HSBC HK  Bank (foreign)  48.42  752  Hong 






containers  Vitro SA de CV  Mfg. glass containers  96.89  737  Mexico  Cash 
Liabilities 











5/7/2001  Proxicom Inc  Pvd e-bus 
consulting,dvlp svc 
Dimension Data 
PLC  Pvd info tech svcs  100  443.481  South 
Africa  Cash 
4/15/2005  Brookstone 
Inc  Own,op novelty stores  OSIM Brookstone 
Holdings LP  Investment company  100  429.656  Singapore Cash 



























Manufacture trucks 100 334.64 Mexico Dep. Share 
Convert. 
Deb.   28
 
Table 3: Number of Acquisitions of U.S. Targets by Emerging-Market Firms & Industry Characteristics, 
1980-2007. 
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for U.S. target by industry from Compustat North America. The first column 
presents the industry code. Column 2 presents the industry description followed by the number of firm-year observations, the 
total number of firms in the industry and the number of firms acquired by emerging-market firms. OIBD/Assets presents the 
average operating income before depreciation, amortization and taxes ($ million). The last two columns present average sales 
($ million) and employment (million) by industry. 






















11  Agriculture  2,015 81 5 78.64 1,025.18  1,540.33 22.12
21  Natural 
Resources  13,486 1,287 12 61.62 483.75  296.16 1.68
22  Utilities  10,085 495 2 24.12 247.60  184.01 0.40
23  Construction  3,733 315 1 34.46 384.54  198.72 1.90
31-33  Manufacturing  92,935 7,604 118 94.72 824.18  1,000.49 6.74
42  Wholesale Trade  9,217 805 8 101.75 1,243.46  1,509.49 7.02
44-45  Retail Trade  10,802 978 16 77.87 743.30  1,475.87 7.76
48-49  Transportation & 
Warehousing  6,417 576 10 251.86 2,886.27  2,441.86 14.35
51  Information  22,753 2,627 30 201.39 1,754.11  737.93 3.21
52  Finance & 
Insurance  30,786 4,828 20 2,244.2765,056.48  8,545.27 18.72
53  Real Estate  6,042 531 8 5.35 147.09  41.96 0.18
54  Professional 
Services  10,097 1,050 6 31.94 200.14  168.12 1.07
56  Administrative 
Services  4,743 492 1 -1.67 20.90  17.80 0.09
62  Health Care & 




Recreation  1,848 193 2 0.83 14.33  11.88 0.18
72  Accommodation 
& Food Services  5,245 469 10 17.36 159.18  167.09 2.59
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Table 4: Evidence of Selection in the Three Years Preceding Acquisition 
 
Notes:  These regressions test whether U.S. firm performance prior to acquisition is correlated with subsequent foreign 
ownership.  The dependent variables are sales, assets, OIBD, cash, debt and employment and the independent variables 
include: D_ foreignt (a dummy variable which indicates those U.S. firms with foreign ownership at time t), D_futureacq (a 
dummy variable which indicates those U.S. firms that become acquisition targets of emerging-market firms three years prior 
to the ownership change), and industry, region and year fixed effects.  The dependent variables are expressed in log terms. 
All significant coefficients are in bold and indicate that foreign investors do not choose target firms at random. * indicates 
significance at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
  Sales  Asset OIBD Cash Debt  Employment
D_foreignt  0.906***  0.952*** 0.281 0.815*** 0.896***  0.737***
  (0.19)  (0.19) (0.21) (0.20) (0.24)  (0.20)
D_futureacqt  0.898***  0.897*** 0.553*** 0.925*** 0.753***  0.790***
  (0.10)  (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13)  (0.10)
Observations  236223  244249 182936 217800 197547  161948






Table 5: Cumulative Abnormal Stock Returns for Acquisition Targets 
 
Notes:  The sample covers acquisitions of U.S. targets by emerging-market firms between January 1, 1980 and July 1, 2007. 
The day of first mention of the acquisition in SDC Thompson is taken as day ‘0’. Abnormal gain to the U.S. target is 
computed as the cumulative abnormal return based on a single factor market model. The estimation period is 280 days before 
and up until 30 days before the event day. The CAR is the cumulative average abnormal return and is described in detail in 
section 4 of the paper. The Patell Z statistic is based on the Patell (1976) test that assumes cross-sectional independence. It is 
constructed by standardizing CAR by the respective standard errors. It follows a standard normal distribution under the null 
hypothesis.  
 
       
       
   Mean Patell
Days  N CAR Z
(-3,+3)  175 8.87% 13.669***
(-1,+1)  175 8.53% 20.068***
(-10,+10)  175 9.71% 8.537***
(-20,+20)  175 11.13% 6.466***
(-30,+30)  175 11.44% 4.871***
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Table 6: Balancing Tests 
 
Notes: These tests check whether our matching approach is capable of grouping together relatively similar firms.  The table 
presents the average difference in each of the covariates between the: (1) acquired firms and the unmatched non-acquired 
firms, and (2) the acquired firms and the matched (reweighted) non-acquired firms.  Differences are normalized by the pooled 
standard deviation of the covariate in the two samples. 
         







Acquired)   %bias
%reduction 
In bias t-test  p>|t|
Age  Unmatched  24.02 23.92 0.90   0.10  0.92
  Matched  24.02 24.11 -0.70 20.10 -0.05  0.96
              
OIBD  Unmatched  198.92 306.99 -8.70   -0.82  0.41
  Matched  198.92 233.18 -2.80 68.30 -0.34  0.73
              
Log Cash  Unmatched  2.42  1.90 20.90   2.20  0.03
  Matched  2.42  2.40 0.70 96.70 0.06  0.96
              
Log Sales  Unmatched  5.38  4.87 22.60   2.29  0.02
  Matched  5.38  5.46 -3.70 83.50 -0.31  0.76
              
Log Assets  Unmatched  5.56  5.27 12.50   1.28  0.20
  Matched  5.56  5.63 -3.20 74.50 -0.26  0.79
              
Log Employment  Unmatched  0.52  0.15 17.50   1.89  0.06
  Matched  0.52  0.60 -3.60 79.50 -0.29  0.77
              
Log Debt  Unmatched  3.31  3.06 8.20   0.88  0.38
  Matched  3.31  3.72 -13.40 -63.50 -1.11  0.27
              
Net Income  Unmatched  0.33  73.73 -12.60   -1.07  0.29
  Matched  0.33  23.17 -3.90 68.90 -0.42  0.68
              
Log Net PPE  Unmatched  3.99  3.58 16.10   1.69  0.09
   Matched  3.99  4.11 -5.00 69.20 -0.40  0.69
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Table 7: Post-Acquisition Performance Characteristics (Propensity Score Matching and Difference-in-
Differences) 
Notes: This table documents difference-in-difference estimates for the post-acquisition performance between 
acquired and "matched control" firms that were not acquired. Panels A-D report post acquisition OIBD/Assets, 
log employment, log net PP&E and log sales, respectively. t={0,5} denotes the post-acqusition year. The 
second column presents the matched coefficient estimate.  Estimates in bold indicate statistical differences in 
measured post-acquisition performance for acquired and matched non-acquired firms. Common support refers 
to the set of firms for whom the propensity score range overlaps across control (non-acquired) and treated 
(acquired) firms. Off support refers to the number of treated (acquired) firms whose propensity score lay above 
the maximum value or below the minimum value for the control (non-acquired) firms. 
Panel A: Post-Acqusition Performance (OIBD/Asset) 





Std. Err.  Z-Stat  P>|z|  Untreated  Treated  Untreated  Treated 
Difference-in-Differences combined with Mahalanobis matching estimates 
0  -0.058  0.035  -1.66  0.097  4,750  126  0  0 
1  -0.016  0.034  -0.47  0.638  4,203  113  0  1 
2  0.015  0.059  0.26  0.793  3,788  100  0  0 
3  -0.007  0.059  -0.12  0.906  3,434  84  0  1 
4  0.083  0.040  2.04  0.041  3,060  72  0  0 
5  0.078  0.037  2.11  0.035  2,743  68  0  0 
                 
Panel B: Post-Acqusition Employment 





Std. Err.  Z-Stat  P>|z|  Untreated  Treated  Untreated  Treated 
Difference-in-Differences combined with Mahalanobis matching estimates 
0  -0.089  0.051  -1.74  0.081  3,063  94  0  0 
1  -0.164  0.071  -2.30  0.021  2,683  82  0  0 
2  -0.202  0.168  -1.20  0.228  2,345  74  0  0 
3  -0.268  0.220  -1.22  0.223  1,897  60  0  0 
4  -0.234  0.199  -1.17  0.240  1,621  50  0  0 
5  -0.389  0.269  -1.44  0.148  1,397  45  0  0 
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Panel C: Post Acquisition Net PP&E 





Std. Err.  Z-Stat  P>|z|  Untreated  Treated  Untreated  Treated 
Difference-in-Differences combined with Mahalanobis matching estimates 
0  -0.191  0.094  -2.04  0.041  4,760  127  0  0 
1  -0.213  0.129  -1.65  0.098  4,203  113  0  1 
2  -0.292  0.145  -2.02  0.044  3,780  101  0  0 
3  -0.158  0.176  -0.90  0.369  3,422  85  0  1 
4  -0.266  0.214  -1.24  0.215  3,043  73  0  0 
5  -0.415  0.259  -1.60  0.109  2,726  67  0  0 
                 
Panel D: Post-Acquisition Sales 





Std. Err.  Z-Stat  P>|z|  Untreated  Treated  Untreated  Treated 
Difference-in-Differences combined with Mahalanobis matching estimates 
0  -0.104  0.063  -1.66  0.098  4,761  126  0  0 
1  -0.215  0.084  -2.56  0.011  4,196  113  0  1 
2  -0.283  0.104  -2.73  0.006  3,770  101  0  0 
3  -0.239  0.117  -2.05  0.040  3,425  85  0  1 
4  -0.280  0.172  -1.63  0.104  3,048  73  0  0 
5  -0.323  0.159  -2.03  0.042  2,737  68  0  0 
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Table 8: Post-Acquisition Performance Characteristics (Simple Difference-in-Differences) 
Notes: This table documents simple difference-in-difference estimates for the post-acquisition performance between acquired 
and control (non-acquired) firms. Panels A-D report post acquisition OIBD/Assets, log employment, log net PP&E and log 
sales, respectively. t={0,5} denotes the post-acqusition year. The second column presents the simple difference-in-differences 
coefficient estimate.  Estimates in bold indicate statistical differences in measured post-acquisition performance for acquired 
and non-acquired firms.  
Panel A: Post-Acqusition Performance (OIBD/Asset) 
t 
Coefficient 
Estimate  Std. Error  Z-Stat  P>|z|  Untreated  Treated 
Simple Difference-in-Differences 
0  -0.061  0.061  -0.99  0.322  4,750  126 
1  0.167  0.985  0.17  0.865  4,203  114 
2  0.358  1.287  0.28  0.781  3,788  100 
3  0.089  0.285  0.31  0.755  3,434  85 
4  0.209  0.56  0.37  0.708  3,060  72 
5  0.103  0.23  0.45  0.656  2,743  68 
        
Panel B: Post-Acquisition Employment 
t 
Coefficient 
Estimate  Std. Error  Z-Stat  P>|z|  Untreated  Treated 
Simple Difference-in-Differences 
0  -0.092  0.307  -0.30  0.765  3,063  94 
1  -0.070  0.321  -0.22  0.827  2,683  82 
2  -0.356  0.333  -1.07  0.285  2,345  74 
3  -0.587  0.361  -1.63  0.104  1,897  60 
4  -0.524  0.380  -1.38  0.167  1,621  50 
5  -0.335  0.392  -0.85  0.394  1,397  45 
        
Panel C: Post Acquisition Net PP&E 
t 
Coefficient 
Estimate  Std. Error  Z-Stat  P>|z|  Untreated  Treated 
Simple Difference-in-Differences 
0  -0.225  0.326  -0.69  0.489  4,760  127 
1  -0.277  0.339  -0.82  0.414  4,203  114 
2  -0.350  0.352  -0.99  0.320  3,780  101 
3  -0.423  0.375  -1.13  0.260  3,422  86 
4  -0.529  0.396  -1.33  0.182  3,043  73 
5  -0.701  0.409  -1.71  0.087  2,726  67 
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Panel D: Post-Acquisition Sales 
t 
Coefficient 
Estimate  Std. Error  Z-Stat  P>|z|  Untreated  Treated 
Simple Difference-in-Differences 
0  -0.063  0.296  -0.21  0.831  4,761  126 
1  -0.220  0.306  -0.72  0.473  4,196  114 
2  -0.335  0.315  -1.06  0.288  3,770  101 
3  -0.379  0.335  -1.13  0.258  3,425  86 
4  -0.460  0.357  -1.29  0.197  3,048  73 
5  -0.454  0.364  -1.25  0.213  2,737  68 
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Table 9: Failed Transactions           
Notes: This table enumerates M&A transactions that were announced but failed to be completed. Columns 1-3 
present the target name, acquiror name and acquiror nation. Columns 4 and 5 present the dates the transactions were 
announced and withdrawn. Columns 6 and 7 present the change in the announced target's change in employment and 
sales in the year the transaction was announced.  
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 


















Ltd  Hong Kong  11/29/2006  11/1/2007  NA  NA 
KDI Corp 
Impala Pacific Corp 
(Ariadne)  Hong Kong  4/28/1986  8/21/1986  -0.538  -0.033 
SSMC Inc 
Berjaya 
Corp(Malaysia)Bhd  Malaysia  2/6/1989  3/22/1989  NA  NA 
Aeronca Inc 
Korean Airlines Co 




Latin America  Argentina  1/7/2003  9/3/2003  NA  NA 
American Maize-
Products Co 
Usaha Tegas Sdn 
Bhd  Malaysia  2/27/1995  7/14/1995  NA  NA 
Bear Stearns Cos 
Inc 
Jardine Strategic 
Holdings Ltd  Hong Kong  9/30/1987  10/23/1987  -0.046  0.009 
Cole National 
Corp 
Moulin Intl Hldgs 
Ltd  Hong Kong  4/15/2004  7/25/2004  NA  0.173 




AS  Turkey  5/9/1990  9/4/1990  NA  NA 
Friedman 




Co Ltd  Hong Kong  3/15/1991  4/1/1992  NA  NA 
Metromedia 
International 













Invt Ltd)  Hong Kong  5/31/1990  12/20/1990  -0.057  0.268 





Corp{CPC}  Taiwan  9/28/1990  12/19/1990  NA  NA 
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Table 10: Robustness Checks (Propensity Score Matching and Difference-in-Differences) 
Notes: This table documents difference-in-differences estimates for the post-acquisition performance between acquired and 
matched non-acquired control firms. Each panel reports post-acquisition OIBD/Assets, log sales and log employment.  
t={0,5} denotes the post-acquisition year. Each column presents the Mahalanobis propensity score matched difference-in-
differences coefficient estimate and bootstrapped standard errors based on reps=100 in parentheses..  Estimates in bold 
indicate statistical differences in measured post-acquisition performance for acquired and matched non-acquired firms.  
             
Panel A: Majority Acquisitions 
t  OIBD/Asset  Log Sales  Log Employment 
0  -0.309  (0.250)  -0.354  (0.184)  -0.423  (0.283) 
1  0.090  (0.175)  -0.280  (0.308)  -0.167  (0.457) 
2  0.325  (0.423)  -0.694  (0.483)  0.006  (0.626) 
3  -0.220  (0.183)  -0.136  (0.472)  0.045  (0.691) 
4  -0.166  (0.168)  -0.455  (0.787)  -0.016  (1.087) 
5  -0.160  (0.171)  -0.808  (1.093)  -0.179  (1.452) 
             
Panel B: Minority Acquisitions 
t  OIBD/Asset  Log Sales  Log Employment 
0  -0.001  (0.024)  -0.086  (0.066)  -0.037  (0.050) 
1  -0.008  (0.031)  -0.193  (0.083)  -0.116  (0.082) 
2  0.012  (0.027)  -0.215  (0.114)  -0.183  (0.162) 
3  0.009  (0.069)  -0.208  (0.135)  -0.232  (0.262) 
4  0.099  (0.053)  -0.231  (0.183)  -0.164  (0.208) 
5  0.096  (0.040)  -0.269  (0.166)  -0.304  (0.279) 
             
Panel C: Cash Acquisitions 
t  OIBD/Asset  Log Sales  Log Employment 
0  -0.052  (0.039)  -0.099  (0.079)  -0.101  (0.054) 
1  0.009  (0.034)  -0.182  (0.092)  -0.144  (0.086) 
2  0.031  (0.097)  -0.255  (0.114)  -0.161  (0.178) 
3  0.008  (0.074)  -0.216  (0.144)  -0.242  (0.269) 
4  0.105  (0.051)  -0.271  (0.171)  -0.249  (0.247) 
5  0.090  (0.043)  -0.293  (0.183)  -0.449  (0.300) 
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Panel D: Manufacturing Acquisitions 
t  OIBD/Asset  Log Sales  Log Employment 
0  -0.044  (0.038)  -0.104  (0.091)  -0.045  (0.048) 
1  0.005  (0.039)  -0.191  (0.126)  -0.144  (0.092) 
2  0.044  (0.039)  -0.150  (0.128)  -0.296  (0.174) 
3  0.084  (0.126)  -0.089  (0.153)  -0.490  (0.205) 
4  0.091  (0.071)  -0.296  (0.253)  -0.464  (0.316) 
5  0.069  (0.061)  -0.302  (0.278)  -0.510  (0.330) 
             
Panel E: East Asian Acquirers from Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea (excluding India and China) 
t  OIBD/Asset  Log Sales  Log Employment 
0  -0.101  (0.065)  -0.127  (0.075)  -0.148  (0.051) 
1  -0.039  (0.040)  -0.256  (0.087)  -0.270  (0.097) 
2  0.016  (0.066)  -0.311  (0.155)  -0.292  (0.232) 
3  -0.038  (0.069)  -0.278  (0.159)  -0.430  (0.293) 
4  0.076  (0.049)  -0.368  (0.205)  -0.441  (0.305) 
5  0.044  (0.045)  -0.390  (0.263)  -0.580  (0.273) 
             
Panel F: East Asian Acquirers including India and China 
t  OIBD/Asset  Log Sales  Log Employment 
0  -0.004  (0.028)  -0.075  (0.100)  -0.003  (0.099) 
1  0.013  (0.050)  -0.163  (0.140)  -0.006  (0.118) 
2  0.015  (0.047)  -0.235  (0.125)  -0.071  (0.190) 
3  0.034  (0.111)  -0.189  (0.185)  0.013  (0.310) 
4  0.092  (0.065)  -0.146  (0.247)  0.168  (0.417) 
5  0.131  (0.079)  -0.222  (0.221)  0.082  (0.623) 
             
Panel G: Horizontal Acquisitions 
t  OIBD/Asset  Log Sales  Log Employment 
0  -0.033  (0.063)  -0.064  (0.107)  0.008  (0.103) 
1  0.029  (0.040)  -0.063  (0.193)  -0.159  (0.180) 
2  0.084  (0.066)  -0.142  (0.283)  -0.501  (0.531) 
3  0.082  (0.053)  -0.220  (0.289)  -0.669  (0.509) 
4  0.008  (0.083)  -0.350  (0.390)  -0.569  (0.629) 
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Panel H: Diversifying Acquisitions 
t  OIBD/Asset  Log Sales  Log Employment 
0  -0.063  (0.043)  -0.111  (0.077)  -0.105  (0.059) 
1  -0.025  (0.036)  -0.244  (0.084)  -0.164  (0.081) 
2  0.003  (0.067)  -0.304  (0.116)  -0.155  (0.174) 
3  -0.026  (0.076)  -0.244  (0.132)  -0.187  (0.242) 
4  0.096  (0.056)  -0.268  (0.170)  -0.160  (0.248) 
5  0.087  (0.045)  -0.358  (0.202)  -0.400  (0.329) 
 
 
Panel I: Diversifying and Minority Acquisitions 
t  OIBD/Asset  Log Sales  Log Employment 
0  -0.027  (0.023)  -0.039  (0.060)  -0.028  (0.079) 
1  -0.062  (0.032)  -0.264  (0.093)  -0.178  (0.093) 
2  0.022  (0.055)  -0.206  (0.126)  -0.269  (0.150) 
3  0.299  (0.273)  -0.164  (0.167)  -0.210  (0.265) 
4  0.013  (0.058)  -0.275  (0.174)  -0.173  (0.231) 
5  0.007  (0.079)  -0.181  (0.228)  -0.375  (0.287) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 